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Abstract
A signcryption scheme combining public key encryptions and digital signatures in
one logical step can simultaneously satisfy the security requirements of confiden-
tiality, integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation and with a cost significantly
lower than that required by the traditional ”signature followed by encryption” ap-
proach. This thesis presents a new generic concept of time-stamped signcryption
scheme with designated verifiability. Here an authenticated time-stamp is associ-
ated with the signcrypted text which can only be verifiable by a specific person,
known as the designated verifier. The time-stamp is provided by a trusted third
party, namely, Time Stamping System (TSS). The scheme is proved to be secure,
as, no one, not even the signcrypter or TSS can produce a valid signcrypted text
on behalf of them. We analyzed the security of the proposed scheme and found
that it can withstand some active attacks. This scheme is resistant against both
inside and outside attacks. The security of our scheme is based upon the hard-
ness of solving Computational Diffie Hellman Problem (CDH), Discrete Logarithm
Problem (DLP) and Integer Factorization Problem (IFP). The proposed scheme
is suitable in scenarios such as, on-line patent submission, on-line lottery, e-cash,
e-bidding and other e-commerce applications. Also we propose an e-cash system
based on our proposed time-stamped signcryption scheme which confirms the no-
tion of e-cash securities like anonymity of the spender, unforgeablity of the digital
coin, prevention of double spending.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the ever rising volume of information in the present computational scenario
the need for security has never been so high. Apart from the volume, the worth
of the information has been the highest. Like any other asset of an organization,
company or even individual, information is the most valuable of all. The decrease
in remoteness of the information and the ever increasing Web Applications adds
to the need to prevent it from falling in the wrong hands, i.e. increasing the
confidentiality of the information. In present day most of the communication takes
place on the insecure channel which makes the message vulnerable to multiple
threats. On the other hand creating a secure channel is quite expensive and not
scalable. While sending a message over an insecure channel such as internet to a
person we must primarily provide four different security requirements such as,
• Confidentiality - Protection from disclosure to unauthorized persons
• Integrity - Maintaining data consistency
• Authentication - Assurance of identity of person or originator of data
• Non-repudiation - Originator of communications can’t deny it later
These are the primary security goals a message passing system must satisfy for a
successful communication. In the past, cryptography mainly concerned with the
confidentiality factor. Then, the most application of cryptography were in the
department of defense or other organization to collect and report secret informa-
tion on an enemy or competitor. In the last decade the other security goals like
integrity verification, user authentication, digital signatures etc. have been added
to the confidentiality factor. Even in ancient times cryptography was used on the
1
Introduction 2
basis of some simple ciphers like the Caesars cipher and passing the keys through
a secured courier system.
1.1 Introduction to Cryptography
Cryptography is the science of hiding information and preventing it from being
changed and accessed by the unauthenticated users/user programs. It includes
applying various modern public key cryptographic schemes to create an encrypted
text which would be completely unintelligible to the adversary (Eve) and can only
be accessed by a person or group of persons authenticated to do so [1, 2]. The com-
plete process can be named as Encryption. While Symmetric Key Cryptography
(common key) was used in the past they are kind of obsolete now due to vari-
ous advancements in technological field and introduction of various algorithms to
check for prime numbers. Now a days Asymmetric key Cryptography is preferred.
So we can classify the cryptography into two parts
• Symmetric Key Cryptography (common key)
• Asymmetric Key Cryptography (different key)
1.1.1 Symmetric Key Cryptography
In symmetric key cryptography the sender encrypts the message and sends it by a
key say k. The receiver decrypts the message after receiving the message by using
the same key k. The assumption is based upon the fact that here, both the sender
and receiver use a common key and the transmission of the message and the key
of cipher text is done in an insecure channel. This system is vulnerable and flawed
if the key k is leaked and it is known to the adversary.
1.1.2 Asymmetric Key Cryptography
To overcome the problems of the symmetric key cryptography or the common key
cryptography public key cryptosystem or public key encipherment is used, we have
the same situation as of symmetric key cryptosystem, with a few exception. First,
there are two keys instead of one, one public key and one private key. To send
a secured message, the sender encrypts with receivers public key. To decrypt the
message the receiver uses his own private key.
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Diffie and Hellman first outlined the Public Key Cryptography methodology, which
could be used for key agreement and had application to other cryptographic prob-
lems [3]. Diffie and Hellman did not provide concrete constructions for how this
concept of public-key cryptography could be implemented in practice. It was not
until the fundamental work of Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman that the first public-
key cryptosystem was realized [4]. The concept of Public Key Cryptography gave
birth to the new remarkable concept of Digital Signature. Electronically digital
signature is the analogous of the traditional handwritten signature. The purpose
of the digital signature is to enable a person to digitally sign some type of elec-
tronic document. One would like for these digital signatures to have the same
properties as traditional signatures: they should be easy to produce, easy to check
and yet difficult to forge. By using the private key to sign, and the public key
to verify, this notion was achieved. As time passed, several other realizations of
public-key cryptosystems and digital signatures were proposed.
1.2 Digital Signature
For a document the most important security goal is it’s Authenticity. In the
physical world conventionally the signature is included in the document as a part
of it, which is not in case of digital signature as the signer or the sender sends
the message and the signature as two separate documents to the receiver which
receives both documents and starts the verification process of checking whether
that the signature actually belongs to the sender. If verified then the document is
accepted else rejected. Digital signature was first proposed by Diffie and Hellman
[3]. In this section, we give a more precise definition of signature scheme which is
based on [5]. The figure 1.1 is from [6].
Definition 1.2.1 (Signature Scheme): A signature scheme is composed of the fol-
lowing three polynomial time algorithms:
• The key generation algorithm (G). On input 1k, where k is the security
parameter, the algorithm G produces a pair (Kp, Ks) of matching public
and secret keys. Algorithm G is probabilistic.
• The signing algorithm (Sign). Given a message m and a pair of matching
public and secret keys (Kp, Ks), Sign produces a signature §. The signing
algorithm might be probabilistic, and in some schemes may also receive other
inputs.
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Figure 1.1: Signature Scheme
• The verification algorithm (Ver). Given a signature § on a message m and a
public key Kp, Ver tests if § is a valid signature of m with respect to Kp. In
general, the verification algorithm need not be probabilistic
1.3 Signature-Then-Encryption
The digital signature paradigm only provides the Authenticity part of the security
goal. To enhance the security to include Confidentiality along with the Authentic-
ity we make use of both signature and encryption. It can be done in two separate
simple steps of signing the document using some signing schemes and the encrypt-
ing it based on some predefined encryption schemes. The various steps can be
written as the follows;
• Signing is done using a Public key DS (Digital Scheme) scheme
• Encrypting the message along with the signature with the use of a existing
private key encryption algorithm under randomly chosen message encryption
key
• Encrypt the random message encryption key using the receivers public key
• Send the message
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1.3.1 Disadvantage of Signature-Then-Encryption
The Signature-Then-Encryption process is associated with several problems and
is quite trivial combination of the two completely independent processes which
can be easily done in separate steps and has no meaning in combining it into one.
Various disadvantages are as follows;
• Unnecessarily consumptiom of machine cycles through out the entire ongoing
process.
• Introduction of extended bits to original messages which in turn increases
the communicational cost.
• Adds to the computational cost which requires a comparable amount of
time for signature verification and decryption cost of delivering a message is
essentially the sum of the cost for digital signature and that for encryption!
1.4 Signcryption
The word signcryption was first coined by Yuliang Zheng in the year 1997 at
Monash University, Australia. According to him signcryption is a cryptographic
primitive which combines both the functions of digital signature and public key en-
cryption logically in a single step, and with a computational cost significantly less
than that needed by the traditional signature-then-encryption approach [7].After
Zhengs proposal, much research has been carried out in the area of signcryption
and its variants [8–12].
It is a new paradigm in public key cryptography that solves all the problems as-
sociated with the previous Signature-Then-Encryption method. It takes logically
a single step to fulfill the functions of both digital signature and public key en-
cryption simultaneously [7]. The cost, both computational and communicational
cost is lower than that required in the previous Signature-Then-Encryption. The
first attempt to provide formal security analysis of signcryption schemes was made
by Steinfeld and Zheng [13], who proposed a signcryption scheme based on the
integer factorization problem and provided a formal security model and proof for
the unforgeability of the proposed scheme. Signcryption can be implemented using
various schemes like ElGamals Shortened Digital Signature, Schnorrs scheme and
any other digital signature schemes in conjunction with a public key encryption
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schemes like DES and 3DES.The choice is made by the user based on the level of
security desired.
1.4.1 Signcryption Features
Basically a signcryption process in consistent of 3 phases implementing different
algorithms: Key Generation, Signcryption, Unsigncryption. The generation phase
creates all the pairs of public and private keys for Alice and Bob. The signcryption
phase creates the signcryption parameter (c,r,s) and sends it to Bob and in the
verification or the designcryption phase the bob verifies the signature using various
designcryption algorithm .
Various features of Digital Signcryption are as follows;
• Unique Unsigncryptability- A message m is signcrypted using a signcryption
algorithm to give a signcrypted output c. The receiver can apply unsign-
cryption algorithm on c to verify the message m. This unsigncryption is
unique to the message m and the sender.
• Security - Ensures that the message sent cant be forged by a untrusted party
.It also ensures the contents of the message are confidential and ensures
nonrepudiation
• Efficiency - Computational involved when applying the Signcryption, Un-
signcryption algorithms and communicational overhead is much smaller than
signature-then-encryption schemes.
1.5 Time-stamp
Time-stamping is a technique for providing proof of existence of certain digital
document or data prior to a specific time [14]. Time-stamping is now widely rec-
ognized as an important mechanism used to ensure the integrity of digital data.
Time-stamping is highly required in many domains like patent submissions, elec-
tronic votes or electronic commerce. Time-stamping is usually enforced to ensure
non-repudiation. A digital signature can only be legally binding if it was made
when the user’s certificate was still valid, and a time-stamp on a signature can
successfully prove this. Time-stamps are provided by trusted third parties, known
as Time Stamping Systems [15, 16]. Without a time-stamp, signed documents can
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Figure 1.2: Issuing and Verification Procedures of a Time Stamp in ISO/IEC
WD 18014
neither be trusted when the signers signature key was lost, stolen, or accidentally
compromised, nor solve the cases when the signer himself repudiates the signing,
claiming that he has accidentally lost his signature key. Even if a time-stamp
is included in the document, no one can believe that the time-stamp is true be-
cause the signer may forge it. To overcome this problem, a trusted party, known
as Time-Stamping Service (TSS), is needed to authenticate the time when the
signature is generated [16].
Digital time-stamping systems were first introduced by Haber and Stornetta [17].
After this, a lot of research has been done in the area of time-stamped signatures
[15–17]. In 2004, Sun et. al proposed a time-stamped signature scheme based
on absolute temporal authentication which was secure against the forward forgery
[16]. Z. Shao proposed a more efficient scheme capable of withstand both forward
and backward forgery with low computational cost [15].
1.5.1 Time-stamping Procedure
ISO/IEC WD 18014 provides a generic model on which time-stamping services
are based. The framework developed in ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27 gives an outline of
the procedure for time-stamping procedure [18]. The issuing procedure consists of
mainly five steps which is shown in the figure 1.2 from [18].
Step 1: The requester sends a request message for time-stamp to TSA (Time-
stamping Authority)
Step 2: After getting a request message TSA checks the completeness of the
request message
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Step 3: After completeness check, TSA generates the time-stamp which includes
at least a time parameter, a hash value of the data to be time-stamped and data
to bind the time parameter to the hash value using a cryptographic technique
Step 4: TSA sends the time-stamp to the requester
Step 5: The requester checks the correctness and completeness of the time-stamp
In the verification procedure a verifier obtains other data required from other
entities and verifies the time-stamp.
1.5.2 Classification of Time-stamp
Conventionally time stamping schemes have been generally classified into three
categories: simple, linking and distributed schemes [19].
Simple Scheme: As the name states the schemes of this category are very simple,
but its security depends on time-stamp issuer’s reliability. Haber and Stornetta
have pointed out that if an issuer fraudulently alters the time parameter of a
certain time-stamp, nobody can detect the alteration [20]. As countermeasures
against the problem, the linking and distributed schemes have been developed.
Linking Scheme: The time-stamp issuer creates a time-stamp which includes
data which are included in other time-stamps issued earlier. So a sequence of time-
stamps is generated. If a dishonest issuer wants to fraudulently alter a particular
time-stamp, it has to alter all the time-stamps relating to that time-stamp. Thus
it is more difficult for an adversary to manipulate a time-stamp in the linking
scheme than in the simple scheme.
Distributed Scheme: In this scheme a time-stamp is created with the coopera-
tion of multiple issuers. One of the prime targets of this scheme is to strengthen
security against the dishonest issuers manipulation of a time-stamp by sharing the
secret data used to generate a time-stamp among the issuers.
1.6 E-cash System
Online digital content transactions through e-commerce are growing exponentially.
In this respect, well-designed electronic payment schemes and high-quality digital
contents are two critical factors [21]. Untraceable electronic cash schemes make
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Table 1.1: Strengths and Limitations of three time-stamping Schemes
Schemes Strengths Limitations
Simple The system is relatively simple It is necessary to assume that
Scheme the issuer is the trusted third party.
Linking The assumption that the issuer is The system is relatively
Scheme the trusted third party is rendered complicated because additional
unnecessary, for example, by the operations for linking all time
periodical publication of a part of stamps are needed.
a chain of time-stamps.
Distributed The assumption that the issuers The system is relatively
Scheme are the trusted third parties is complicated because multiple
rendered unnecessary by sharing issuers generate a time-stamp
the secret data among multiple cooperatively.
issuers.
it possible for customers to pay the e-cash to the merchants through communi-
cation networks under privacy protection. Therefore, there is a need to invent
new electronic payment protocols with strong cryptographic algorithms that will
eventually replace present day paper-based cash schemes. Chaum suggested the
first electronic cash system in 1983 [22].
An e-cash system has some well-defined features. We outline some of them below
[21].
• Anonymity: The spender or the payer of the cash must remain anonymous.
If the coin is spent legitimately, neither the merchant nor the bank can
identify the payerme
• Unreusability: The digital cash cannot be copied and reused. Then we have
to minimize the risks for forgery and establish a good authenticity system.
• Unforgeability: Only authorized parties (i.e. the bank) can produce digital
coins.
• Off-line Payment: The transaction can be done off-line, meaning no com-
munication with the central bank is needed during the transaction.
• Transferability: Electronic transactions are online ond off-line.
• Divisibility: Digital cash can be divided into smaller amounts.
• Portability: The security and use of digital cash is not dependent on any
physical location. The cash can be transferred through computer networks
into storage devices and vice versa
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Three types of entities are usually present in an e-cash system.
• Payer or Consumer
• Payee or Merchant
• Financial network with whom both payer and payee have accounts (usually
a Bank)
Three types of transactions take place in a normal e-cash system
• Withdrawal: the payer withdraws money in terms of digital coin
• Payment: the payer transfers the digital coin to the payee.
• Deposit: the payee transfers digital coin received to the bank account.
1.7 Our Contribution
In this thesis, we have contributed the following:
• We have proposed a new time-stamped signcryption scheme based upon hard
computations such as DLP, IFP and CDH. We have analyzed the security
of the scheme and also implemented it.
• We have designed an e-cash system based upon the proposed time-stamped
signcryption scheme.
1.8 Organization of Thesis
In Chapter 2, we have given the literature survey which includes the review of a
time-stamped signature scheme and one signcryption scheme. At the end we have
given the mathematical preliminaries which have been used throughout the thesis.
In Chapter 3, we have proposed our new time-stamped signcryption scheme. Also
the security analysis and the implementation result has been given in this chapter.
In Chapter 4, we have proposed a new e-cash system. Also the security is analysed
in this chapter.
In Chapter 5 we provide conclusion of this thesis and future research directions.
Chapter 2
Literature Survey
2.1 Review of Time-stamped Signature Scheme
The existing time-stamped signature scheme is based upon DLP [23]. The signa-
ture consists of time-stamp which is properly authenticated and is provided by a
trusted third party, known as Time-Stamping Service (TSS), which attaches the
time-stamp without the knowledge of the content of the document. The signature
can be verified universally, i.e., anyone can verify the validity of the signature using
systems public parameters. The security of this scheme is proved based upon the
assumption of some hard problems in computer science like integer factorization
problem and DLP.
The scheme consists of 3 phases; key generation phase or the setup phase, the time-
stamped signature generation phase and signature verification phase. There are
three parties present in the existing time-stamped signature scheme: A signer who
signs the document, a verifier who verifies the document and a TSS who provides
time-stamp to the document. The operations of various phases are shown in Figure
1.In the proposed scheme, the following notations are used.
xA: the private key of the signer.
yA: the public key of the signer.
xB: the private key of the TSS.
yB: the public key of the TSS.
p: a large prime with 512 bits
11
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q: a large prime with q|p–1.
g: an order q generator in Zp∗
h(. ): a collision resistant hash function.
2.1.1 Key Generation
The TSS chooses an integer n as the product of two large primes p and q such
that p = 2fp
′
+ 1 and q = 2fq
′
+ 1, where f, p
′
and q
′
are all large primes. Then
he chooses a generator g ∈ Z∗p with order q and a secure hash function h( ) such
as SHA 1.Here p, g and h( ) are public system parameters which are authentically
known to all users.
The TSS chooses his private key xB ∈ Z∗q and computes his public key yB =
gxB(mod p). Similarly, the signer chooses his private key xA ∈ Z∗q and computes
yA = g
xA(modp) as his public key.
2.1.2 Signature Generation:
This algorithm takes the message m, public and private keys of signer and that of
TSS and outputs timestamped signature σ = (l, S)
The steps of time-stamped signature generation are given below.
Step 1: The signer computes f as follows and sends it to the TSS.
f = h(m) (2.1)
Step 2: After receiving f, the TSS chooses k ∈ Z∗q and computes
r = f.gk+t.yB(modp) (2.2)
Here t is the timestamp of the signature. The value of t may be current date or
time of the signature generation. Then the TSS sends r to the signer
Step 3: After obtaining r, the signer computes l and partial signature (S1) as
follows.
l = h(m, r) (2.3)
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S1 = l.xA(modp) (2.4)
After that, the signer sends S1 to the TSS.
Step 4: The TSS computes S as follows and sends it to the signer.
S = k − S1 + xB(modp) (2.5)
The signature of message m is σ = (l, S) with timestamp t.
2.1.3 Signature Verification:
Anyone having signature ∂ = (l, S) with timestamp t of message m can verify as
follows.
Step 1: First computes f and r
′
as given below.
f = h(m) (2.6)
r′ = f.ylA.g
S+t(modp) (2.7)
Step 2: Then computes
l′ = h(m, r′) (2.8)
If l = l′, then the signature is considered to be a valid one. Otherwise, it is
rejected.
2.1.4 Correctness Verification and Security analysis:
Two well-known computationally hard problems: integer factorization and discrete
logarithm problem [24] are the basis of the security of the existing time-stamped
signature scheme.In the proposed scheme, p and q are very large primes, Hence the
solving for p and q lies in the complexity of solving integer factorization problem.
Also, to get k from r, an adversary has to solve discrete logarithm problem. Also
the TSS cannot generate the full signature S by himself, as the partial signature is
constructed using the secret key of signer and is secured under DLP assumption.
The time-stamped signature (S, l) is indeed a valid authenticated signature from
the trusted party TSS, the correctness of the signature is given below.
r′ = f.ylA.g
S+t(modp) (2.9)
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Figure 2.1: Operations of the Time-stamped Signature Scheme
= f.gxA.l.gk−S1+xB+t(modp) (2.10)
= f.gxA.l.gk−l.xA+xB+t(modp) (2.11)
= f.gxA.l+k−l.xA+xB+t(modp) (2.12)
= f.gk+xB+t(modp) (2.13)
= f.gk+t.gxB(modp) (2.14)
= f.gk+t.yB(modp) = r (2.15)
The time-stamped signature (S, l) is universally verifiable. Anyone having access
to the message and public parameters of the system, can verify the authenticity
of the signature.
2.2 Review of Tso et.al. Signcryption Scheme:
The signcryption scheme proposed by Tso et.al. is a generic signcryption scheme
with three parameters (c,r,s) of the signcrypted cipher text [25]. This scheme is
the improvement of the Huang et. als scheme since the scheme overcomes the
weak points of Huang et. als scheme [26]. Also this scheme provided public
verifiability of the signature. Also the scheme supports the verification with only
the message and Signcryption and the rest information provided by the receiver
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are not required. The scheme was mainly useful in the applications where the
memory size is restricted.
2.2.1 Setup :
On input a security parameter 1 to the setup algorithm, the following outputs
form the public parameters.
p, q : two large prime such that q is a prime divisor of p – 1 .
g: an element of Z∗p of order q
H : {0, 1}∗ ∈ Z∗q : a collision resistant one way function.
2.2.2 KeyGen :
The KeyGen algorithm generates the public and private key pairs of signer and
receiver.
Alices Private Key xA ∈ Z∗q
Alices Public key yA = g
xA(mod p)
Bobs Private Key xB ∈ Z∗q
Bobs Public key yB = g
xB(mod p)
2.2.3 Signcrypt :
To signcrypt a message m ∈ Zp\ {-1,0,1} Alice does the following steps
1. Chooses a random no ∈ Z∗q , computes e = ykB (mod p) and e′ = e/gcd(e, p− 1)
2. Compute c = me
′
(mod p)
3. Computes r = H(m, yA, yB, g
kmodp)
4. Computes s = k − rxA mod q
The signcrypt message is σ = (c, r, s)
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2.2.4 Designcrypt :
Bob receives σ = (c, r, s) from Alice and first recovers eˆ and e
′
by computing
eˆ = ysBy
rxB
A mod p and e
′
= eˆ/gcd(eˆ, p− 1). Then he solves e′d = 1 mod p–1 and
then message by computing m˜ = cd mod p. Bob accepts m˜ if and only if
r = H(m˜, yA, yB, y
r
Ag
smodp)
2.2.5 Correctness :
The message m can be recovered by the receiver successfully since,
eˆ = ysBy
rxB
A modp (2.16)
= ysBg
rxBxAmodp (2.17)
= ysBy
rxA
B modp (2.18)
= ys+rxAB modp (2.19)
= ykBmodp = e (2.20)
Moreover e
′
= e/gcd(e, p − 1), so e′ and p − 1 are co-primes and a d exists such
that
e
′
d = 1 mod p–1
Therefore cd = me
′
d = m .
2.3 Mathematical Preliminaries
We used the following basic notation, definitions and models used throughout this
thesis.
2.3.1 Notation and Terminology
All groups discussed in this thesis are assumed to be abelian. Groups of prime
order have useful properties and are widely used in cryptography. All groups of
prime order are cyclic.
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Definition 1. A group G is cyclic if there is an element g ∈ G, such that for each
g
′ ∈ G, there is an integer a with g′ = ga .Such an element is called a generator of
G. For any prime integer p, the field of integers modulo p is denoted by Zp. The
cyclic multiplicative group of nonzero elements in Zp is denoted as Z
∗
p [27].
2.3.2 Discrete Logarithmic Problem (DLP)
Specifically in abstract algebra and its applications, discrete logarithms are group
theoretic analogues of ordinary logarithms. In particular, an ordinary logarithm
log(a, b) is a solution of the equation ax = b over the real or complex numbers.
Similarly, if g and h are elements of a finite cyclic group G then a solution x of the
equation gx = h is called a discrete logarithm to the base g of h in the group G.
Briefly, if G is a finite group, the problem discrete logarithm in G is the following
computational problem: given elements α and β in G, determine an integer x such
that, αx = β provided that such an integer exists [24].
2.3.3 Computational Diffie-Hellman problem
The Diffie-Hellman problem is stated as follows. If g is a generator of some group
(typically the multiplicative group of a finite field) and x, y are randomly choosen
integers. Consider a cyclic group G of order q. The CDH assumption states that,
given (g, ga, gb) for a randomly choosen generator g and a, b ∈ {0, ..., q − 1} it is
computationally infeasible to compute the value of [6].
2.3.4 The Integer Factorization Problem
Definition 2: The integer factorization problem is the following: given a positive
integer n, find its prime factorization; that is, write n = pe11 p
e2
2 ...p
ek
k where the pi
are pairwise distinct primes and each e1 ≥ 1 [27].
2.3.5 Safe Primes
These primes are called ”safe” because of their relationship to strong primes. A
prime number is a strong prime if q + 1 and q − 1 both have large prime factors.
For a safe prime,q = 2p + 1 , the integer p is a large prime factor. Safe primes
are also important in the area of cryptography because of their use in discrete
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logarithm-based techniques like Diffie-Hellman key exchange. If 2p + 1 is a safe
prime, the multiplicative subgroup of numbers modulo. 2p+ 1 has a subgroup of
large prime order. The reason for using safe primes is to minimize the modulus
[23].
Chapter 3
Proposed Time-stamped
Signcryption Scheme
In this chapter we propose the concept of a strong designated verifier time-stamped
signcryption scheme. With this scheme, a user can anonymously signcrypts a mes-
sage in collaboration with a trusted authority, known as Time Stamping System
(TSS) and the ciphertext can only be deciphered by the designated verifier. The
recipient knows that the information is from the user. However, except for the
recipient, no one can verify the authenticity of the message. Our scheme is moti-
vated by signcryption scheme, time-stamp and strong designated verifier signature
scheme. In this scheme, only an authorized person can recover the message from
a signcrypted text. This scheme establishes strong non repudiation between the
signcrypter and a designated verifier. The proposed scheme is proved to be resis-
tant against some active attacks and very much applicable in e-cash and e-voting
systems.
There are three parties in the proposed scheme: the signer who signcrypts a doc-
ument; the TSS, who is responsible for adding time-stamps into the signcryption;
and the verifier, who checks the validity of the time-stamped signcryption. This
scheme consists of three phases: key generation, signcryption generation and De-
signcryption. In the proposed scheme, we shall use the following notations.
xS: the private key of the signer.
yS: the public key of the signer.
xT : the private key of the TSS.
yT : the public key of the TSS.
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xV : the private key of the Verifier.
yV : the public key of the Verifier.
p: a large prime with 512 bits
q: a large prime with q|p–1.
g: an order q generator in Zp∗
h(. ): a collision resistant hash function.
3.1 Key Generation:
The TSS chooses an integer n as the product of two large primes p and q such
that p = 2fp
′
+ 1 and q = 2fq
′
+ 1, where f, p
′
and q
′
are all large primes. Then
he chooses a generator g ∈ Z∗p with order q and a secure hash function h( ) such
as SHA 1.Here p, g and h( ) are public system parameters which are authentically
known to all users.
The TSS chooses his private key xT ∈ Z∗q and computes his public key yT =
gxT (mod p). The Verifier chooses his private key xV ∈ Z∗q and computes his
public key yV = g
xV (mod p). Similarly, the signer chooses his private key xS ∈ Z∗q
and computes yS = g
xS(modp) as his public key.
3.2 Signcryption Generation:
To signcrypt a message m, this algorithm needs the public key of verifier and the
private keys of Signer and TSS (Time Stamping Service). This algorithm outputs
time-stamped signcryption σ = (c, r2, s)
The steps of time-stamped signcryption generation are given below.
Step 1: The signer computes f as follows and sends it to the TSS.
f = h(m) (3.1)
Step 2: After receiving f, the TSS chooses k1 ∈ Z∗q and computes
r1 = g
k1(modp) (3.2)
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e1 = h(t, f) (3.3)
s1 = e1.xT + k1 (3.4)
Here t is the time-stamp of the signature. The value of t may be current date or
time of the signature generation. TSS sends r1, s1, e1, t to the signer
Step 3: In this step the signer first computes e′1 = h(t, f) and compares it with e1.
If e1 = e
′
1, the time-stamp is accepted otherwise it is rejected and the signcryp-
tion process is aborted from here. If the time-stamp is accepted the signcryption
process is followed as below.
The signer chooses a random number k2 ∈ Zq∗ , then computes
e2 = yV
k2modp (3.5)
e′2 = e2/gcd(e2, p− 1) (3.6)
c = me
′
2modp (3.7)
r2 = h(m, g
k2modp) (3.8)
s = k2 − r2.xS − s1modp (3.9)
The signcryption of message m is σ = (c, r2, s) with time-stamp t and it is sent to
the verifier for designcryption.
3.3 Designcryption:
Step:1 After receiving σ = (c, r2, s) from the signer, the verifier first recovers eˆ2
and e′2 by computing
eˆ2 = y
s
V .y
r2xV
S .y
e1xV
T .r
xV
1 (3.10)
e′2 = eˆ2/gcd(eˆ2, p− 1) (3.11)
Step 2: Then he solves d from e′d = 1mod p-1 and then recover the message by
computing
m˜ = cdmodp (3.12)
r′2 = h(m˜, (y
r2
S .y
e1
T .g
s.r1)modp) (3.13)
The verifier accepts m˜ if and only if r2 = r
′
2 Otherwise, it is rejected.
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3.4 Correctness Verification:
The message m can be recovered succesfully by the verifier if the signer produced
σ by the proposed scheme honestly, since
eˆ2 = y
s
V .y
r2xV
S .y
e1xV
T .r
xV
1 (3.14)
= ysV .g
xV r2xS .gxV e1xT .gxV k1 . (3.15)
= ysV .y
r2xS
V .y
e1xT
V .y
k1
V (3.16)
= ys+r2xS+e1xT+k1V (3.17)
= ys+r2xS+s1V (3.18)
= yk2V (3.19)
= e2 (3.20)
Moreover e′2 = e2/gcd(e2, p − 1), so e′2 and p-1 are co-primes and a d exists such
that e′2.d = 1 mod p-1. Therefore
cd = me
′
2.d = m (3.21)
After m˜ is recovered, if m˜ = m then the equation r2 = r
′
2 will hold. Since
yr2S .y
e1
T .g
s.r1 (3.22)
= gs.gxSr2 .gxT e1 .gk1 (3.23)
= gs.gxSr2 .gs1 (3.24)
= gs+r2.xS+s1 (3.25)
= gk2 (3.26)
Hence message m˜ will be accepted as the required message if and only if r2 = r
′
2.
3.5 Discussion and Security Analysis of the Pro-
posed Scheme
Our scheme provides the 4 notion of security i.e authentication, confidentiality, in-
tegrity, and non-repudiation.In this section we will see how our scheme will satisfy
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Figure 3.1: Operations of the Proposed Time-stamped Signcryption Scheme
all these notion of security.
First of all the signer creates a digest of the original message f = h(m) to be sent
to the TSS. This is done because the message should not be disclosed to the TSS.
In this way the integrity and the confidentiality of the message is preserved in
the first step. In the second step the time-stamping is done. The parameters k1
and the private key xT are secret and only known to the TSS. Since our scheme
provides absolute temporal authentication, absolute time is integrated in this step,
which may be the current system time. The TSS generates a partial signature s1
which includes the private key xT and e1 which in turn includes the time-stamp t.
The overall operations of the proposed scheme have been shown in the Figure1.
To be able to verify signed documents in a long period of time, the TSS must be
trustable. However, if a TSS is damaged or hacked, then all issued time-stamps
become invalid. To resolve the problem, after issuing an amount of time-stamps
which is called a session, all issued time-stamps in one round are published. This
feature makes it possible that the TSS does not have to be unconditionally trusted
all the times because all publicized time-stamps cannot be forged. Therefore, we
only have to trust TSS during the session that a time-stamp was requested and
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issued for a particular message.
In the next step signer first validates the time-stamp integrated by TSS by com-
paring e1 = e
′
1 or not. Then signer generates k1 which is private and only known
to signer. Then it computes e2 and e
′
2 to do the encryption. then finally the
signature is generated after computing r2. Finally c,r2, s together constitute the
signcryption of the given message m. In this step encryption and signature is done
in one logical step unlike ”signature then encryption”.
The original message can only be derivd from the signcrypted message only and
only by the deisgnated verifier since the calculation includes the private parameter
xV of the verifier. Hence the confidentiality is preserved. Again to get the mes-
sage the verifier uses the public key of signer yS, which shows that the our scheme
preserves authenticity.
Our scheme is designed in such a way that neither the TSS nor the signer can
generate a complete signcryption all alone, because to generate the signcryption
we need s1 and for that the secret parameters of TSS must be known which is not
possible. So signer can not generate it alone and in the same way the TSS can not
know the private parameters of signer, so TSS also can not generate it alone.
If the signer denies the signature of the message m, the verifier can prove the
dishonesty of the signer by opening m with the original signcryption σ = (c, r2, s).
With this information anyone can veriify the validity of the original signcryption
by checking
r′2 = h(m˜, (y
r2
S .y
e1
T .g
s.r1)modp) (3.27)
This shows that our scheme preserves the non-repudiation property.
Attack 1: An adversary tries to reveal the secret key x from the public parameters.
Security analysis: The adversary can tries to obtain xS or xT or xV from pub-
lic keys yS, yT and yV has to solve the equation of form Y = gx (mod n), which
is clearly a discrete logarithm problem. An adversary tries to forge a signature
have to obtain secret parameters of both signer and TTS, whose security lies in
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the difficulty of solving integer factorization and discrete logarithm problem.
Attack 2:An adversary tries to directly forge the time-stamp.
Security analysis: To forge the time-stamp the adversary has to compute s1 for
which two secret parameters xT and k1 are needed. To get xT adversary has to
solve the equation yT = g
xT (mod p) which is clearly a DLP. Again to get k1 it has
to solve r1 = g
k1 which is again a DLP.
Attack 3:An adversary tries to derive the message form the ciphertext.
Security analysis: The message m can not be derived from the ciphertext c = me
′
2
mod p becaus of the discrete log problem (DLP). To break the confidentiality of
the scheme one must know e2, e
′
2 or d. on the otherhand according to our scheme,
the adversary cannot derive e′2 and d without knowing e2 where e2 = yV
k2modp is
the common secret between signer and receiver.
Attack 4:A dishonest signer tries to forge the time-stamped signcryption all alone.
Security analysis: To do this the signer has to compute s1 for which two pri-
vate parameters xT and k1 are needed. To get the these parameters the signer has
to solve DLP, which is computationally hard problem.
Attack 5:A dishonest TSS tries to forge the time-stamped signcryption all alone.
Security analysis: To do this the TSS has to compute s for which two private
parameters xS and k2 are needed. Again to get the these parameters the signer
has to solve DLP, which is computationally hard problem.
3.6 Performance Evaluation and Implementation
Result
The proposed scheme is implemented in Java using java.security package. We have
taken input as different size of messages and the time for Signcryption generation
and designcryption is compared for different message sizes. The comparison is
given in the following table
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Table 3.1: Performance Comparison of the proposed scheme for different sizes
of message
Message Size Signcryption Time Designcryption Time Length of Signcryption
(in kb) (in ms) (in ms) (in bytes)
0.05 11 25 64
0.5 18 30 64
5 189 34 64
50 557 40 64
Figure 3.2: Screenshot of the output for message size 0.05KB
Figure 3.3: Screenshot of the output for message size 0.5KB
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Figure 3.4: Screenshot of the output for message size 5KB
Figure 3.5: Screenshot of the output for message size 50KB
Chapter 4
Proposed e-cash System
In this chapter we present the proposed e-cash system which preserves the basic
security requirements of an e-cash system. Our proposed e-cash system is based
upon the proposed Time-stamped Signcryption scheme discussed in the last chap-
ter. In this e-cash system we have 4 parties.
• Bank which pays the customer and merchant the requested amount if they
satisfy the required condition.
• Customer (Payer) who withdraws some amount from bank and pays to
the merchant
• Merchant(Payee) who receives the payment from the customer and de-
posits to the bank
• TSS (Time Stamping System) who attaches the time-stamp to the dig-
ital coin.
Three types of transactions are there in the proposed system
• Withdrawal: the payer withdraws money in terms of digital coin .
• Payment: the payer transfers the digital coin to the payee.
• Deposit: the payee transfers digital coin received to the bank account.
In the proposed system, we shall use the following notations.
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Figure 4.1: Proposed e-cash System
xC : the private key of the Customer.
yC : the public key of the Customer.
xM : the private key of the Merchant.
yM : the public key of the Merchant.
xT : the private key of the TSS.
yT : the public key of the TSS.
xB : the private key of the Bank.
yB : the public key of the Bank.
H(.): a collision resistant hash function.
Sign(): A signing algorithm (e.g Elgamal or Schnorr Signature)
V erify(): A verification algorithm of the corresponding signing algorithm
Signcrypt(): The Signcryption algorithm of proposed scheme in previous chapter
Designcrypt(): Designcryption algorithm of proposed scheme in previous chapter
Time stamp(): Time-stamping algorithm performed by TSS to add time-stamp
4.1 Steps in the Proposed e-cash System
Step 1: First of all the customer creates customer info message (CI) as follows
C AMT: the amount to be requested to the bank by the customer C ACT NO:
account number of the customer.
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Figure 4.2: Customer Information (CI)
Figure 4.3: Digital Coin Information (COIN)
Customer sends a request to the bank to issue digital coin. The request is in the
form of a digital signature on the CI with customers private key.
S1 = Sign(xC , CI) (4.1)
Customer sends S1 along with CI to bank
Step 2: When Bank receives S1 and the CI, it first verifies the authenticity of the
request with the public key of the customer (yC).
verify(S1, yC , CI) (4.2)
After successful verification, bank first checks whether the ACT NO exits in the
bank or not and if exists then whether the account has balance more than the
requested amount.(C AMT). If balance is available bank creates a digital coin
(COIN) which contains the following
C ACT NO: Customers account number
TOKEN ID: COIN number
SEQ NO: Transaction number
EXPIRY: date and time of COINs expiry after which COIN becomes invalid
TS: Time-stamp on the COIN i.e the time and date when the COIN is created
C AMT: the amount the COIN holds.
Then bank puts its own digital signature on the COIN with its own private key.
S2 = Sign(xB, COIN) (4.3)
Bank sends the signatureS2 along with the COIN to the customer.
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Figure 4.4: Order Information (OI)
Step 3: When customer receives COIN and the signature S2, it first verifies the
authenticity of the COIN with the public key of the bank
verify(S2, yB, COIN) (4.4)
If verified the COIN is accepted by the customer. Now the customer creates a
digest of the COIN with a collision less hash function
h = H(COIN) (4.5)
Customer sends this digest h to the TSS to get a time-stamp.
Step 4: TSS puts time-stamp according to steps of the proposed time-stamped
Signcryption scheme discussed in previous chapter
T = Time stamp(h) (4.6)
T is sent back to the customer
Step 5: After receiving the time-stamp (T), customer generates the Signcryption
on the coin
σ = Signcrypt(xC , yM , COIN, T ) (4.7)
Now the customer creates the order information (OI) which contains the item
information to be purchased and the amount to be paid.
TOKEN ID: ID of the digital COIN
ITEM CODE: The item code to be purchased from the merchant
C AMT: Amount to be paid by customer to merchant
Then the customer puts its own signature on the OI.
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Figure 4.5: Merchant Information (MI)
S3 = Sign(Xc, OI) (4.8)
Customer sends both the signature S3 and the signcrypted COIN (σ) along with
the OI to the merchant.
Step 6: Merchant verifies the authenticity of the signatureS3 with the public key
of customer
verify(S3, yC , OI) (4.9)
If the signature is verified successfully, it accepts the signcrypted COIN (σ) and
OI both and sends an acknowledgement to the customer. The acknowledgement
can be a simple message or e-mail.
Step 7: Now merchant creates merchant information (MI) to send to the bank to
deposit the COIN and get the required amount to his account.
M ACT NO: Merchants account number M AMT: The amount merchant is ex-
pected to get from the bank
Then merchant puts its own signature on the MI with its private key xM
S4 = Sign(xM ,MI) (4.10)
Merchant then sends both the signcrypted COIN(σ) and S4 to the Bank along
with the MI.
Step 8: After receiving signcrypted COIN (σ),S4 and MI, Bank first of all verifies
the authenticity of the signature.
verify(S4, yM ,MI) (4.11)
If verified successfully, that means the MI is from the authorized merchant. Then
Bank designcrypts the signcrypted COIN using the steps of the proposed time-
stamped signcryption scheme.
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Designcrypt(σ,MI, yB, yT , yC) (4.12)
In the designcryption process it verifies that the COIN is authenticated one and
also the COINs content is decrypted. Then Bank compares C AMT from COIN
and M AMT from MI. If both match, then Bank credits that much amount to
the merchants account no (M ACT NO) and a successful acknowledgement is sent
to the Merchant. Else a negative acknowledgement is sent to the merchant stat-
ing that there is some mismatch and the case is resolved between customer and
merchant.
4.2 Security Analysis of the Proposed e-cash Sys-
tem
THEOREM 1- If the time-stamped signcryption is secure against forgery then
the digital coin (COIN) is also unforgeable.
Proof: To forge the digital coin COIN, the adversary has to generate a valid
time-stamped signcryption scheme which means it has to get the private keys of
the Customer and also the TSS. To get the private keys the adversary has to solve
the DLP, which has been assumed to be computationally hard. Hence our digital
coin (COIN) is unforgeable.
THEOREM 2- The customer can pay the COIN full anonymously without re-
vealing its identification and other information.
Proof: The customer account information is included in the digital coin COIN
which is sent to the merchant in a signcrypted format. Since our signcryption
scheme is unforgeable, hence the merchant cannot break it and so it neither can
know the identification of customer or its account number. Hence the scheme
provides confidentiality to the active COIN and confirms the anonymity of the
customer.
Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Scope
In this thesis we propose a strong designated verifier time-stamped signcryption
scheme based upon two hard problems i.e. discrete logarithm problem and integer
factorization problem. This scheme preserves all the required security properties
such as authenticity, integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation. Neither the
signer, nor the TSS can produce a valid signcryption all by themselves. Using
the time-stamp we can solve the case when the signer himself repudiates the sign-
ing, claiming that has accidentally lost his private key. Also we have shown the
few active attacks and how our scheme is resistant against those attacks. The pro-
posed scheme can have wide applications in real life scenarios, such as, in e-voting,
online auction, online lottery and transfer of patents where both confidentiality
and authenticity is highly required.Also we propose an e-cash system based on
our proposed time-stamped signcryption scheme which confirms the notion of e-
cash securities like anonymity of the spender, unforgeablity of the digital coin,
prevention of double spending
In future research can be done on our scheme to lower its computation cost and
communication overhead. Also research can be done to incorporate time-stamping
feature to some of the highly proved secured signcryption schemes which can
be applicable to highly security sensitive application like e-bidding, e-voting, e-
transactions etc.
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